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Cellphones, Stingrays, and Searches! An 
Inquiry into the Legality of Cellular 
Location Information 
JEREMY H. D’AMICO* 
   Can the Fourth Amendment protect an individual’s right 
privacy by preventing the disclosure of her location through 
cell site location information? Does it currently? Should it? 
Many court opinions answer these questions in both the af-
firmative and the negative. The rationale underlying each 
conclusion is disparate. Some rely on statutory regimes, oth-
ers rely on the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of reasonableness. However, Cell Site Location Information 
is a technology that requires uniformity in its interpretation. 
This note investigates the different interpretations of the 
Fourth Amendment as it relates to Cell Site Location Infor-
mation. It explains the technology behind Cell Site Location 
Information, and then proffers a framework to unify the 
analysis of whether there is an expectation in Cell Site Lo-
cation Information by modifying the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Katz test. This note does not seek to offer an opinion on 
whether Cell Site Location Information should be within the 
zone of reasonable privacy expectations. Instead, the analyt-
ical framework internalizes the privacy interests of the indi-
vidual and the governmental interest in ferreting out crime. 
It is striking this balance when analyzing these issues that 
                                                                                                             
 *  J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Miami School of Law. I thank Brian S. 
Goldenberg for his inspiration, the members of the University of Miami Law Re-
view, and the University of Miami School of Law. 
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will help the courts to uniformly investigate the privacy im-
plications of Cell Site Location Information.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1973, Martin Cooper placed the first public cellphone call 
from Manhattan.1 Today, cellphones are remarkably small and have 
more computational capacity than NASA had during the Apollo 
                                                                                                             
 1 Mobile phone’s 40th anniversary: from ‘bricks’ to clicks, THE GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 3, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technol-
ogy/2013/apr/03/mobile-phone-40th-anniversary. 
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era.2 Cellphones are no longer used solely to place phone calls, mak-
ing the term almost a misnomer. Chief Justice Roberts aptly noted 
that cellphones can “easily be called cameras, video players, ro-
lodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televi-
sions, maps, or newspapers.”3 Many people rely on their cellphones 
daily, such that the “proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude 
they were an important feature of human anatomy.”4 A cellphone 
can now perform a number of tasks: make calls, send texts and e-
mails, run apps, and explore the internet. But, the way a cellphone 
enables the performance of those tasks may remove any expectation 
of privacy not just of its contents but also in the user’s location. De-
pending on the jurisdiction, the government can obtain location in-
formation without a warrant or probable cause, so long as it can 
show that the location information is relevant to any ongoing crim-
inal investigation—even one that is not targeting the user. 
The benefits of a modern cellphone that contribute to its ubiquity 
come with a burden: law enforcement agencies can acquire a per-
son’s cell-site location information (“CSLI”) cheaply and quickly, 
and they can do so without ever contacting the user.5 Considering 
that most adults carry a cellphone,6 a broad interpretation of the 
third-party doctrine has allowed government actors to track a per-
son’s movements while evading the strict statutory requirements for 
affixing a tangible tracking device to one’s property. 
The application of the third-party doctrine has led to conflict 
among state supreme courts, federal courts of appeals, and several 
lower courts. As a result, courts have drawn unworkable distinc-
tions. For instance, courts disagree not only on the ultimate issue of 
whether obtaining CSLI without a warrant is a search, but they also 
                                                                                                             
 2 Do-It-Yourself Podcast: Rocket Evolution, NASA, 
http://www.nasa.gov/audience/foreducators/diypodcast/rocket-evolution-index-
diy.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (noting that a “cell phone has more computing 
power than the computers used during the Apollo era”). 
 3 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (holding a warrantless 
search of the contents of a cellphone absent exigent circumstances unconstitu-
tional under the Fourth Amendment). 
 4 Id. at 2484. 
 5 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012); see also infra Section III.C. 
 6 See Lee Rainie, Cell phone ownership hits 91% of adults, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR. (June 6, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-
phone-ownership-hits-91-of-adults/. 
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disagree about the legal mechanism that empowers the government 
to obtain CSLI. This debate has provided fertile ground for many 
notes, comments, and scholarly articles.7 In addition, the recent out-
ing of law enforcement’s use of Stingray devices,8 or “portable per-
sonal cell towers,” adds yet another element to the inquiry. These 
Stingray devices simulate third-party service providers and function 
under the umbrella of cellular technology. Because Stingray systems 
do not require a third-party service provider, the constitutionality of 
their use may pose related but different questions regarding their le-
gality. 
Can the protection offered by the Fourth Amendment continue 
perpetually in the face of these technologies? This comment surveys 
the CSLI debate. Part II lends a much-needed survey of the technol-
ogy behind CSLI and Stingray devices. Part III summarizes the cur-
rent state of privacy jurisprudence. Part IV discusses the argument 
surrounding whether obtaining CSLI is an unreasonable search. Part 
V tackles the privacy implications regarding the government’s use 
of Stingray technology. Last, although a litany of scholarship sur-
rounds the CSLI debate, many advocate for a legislative solution. 
However, notwithstanding the calls for congressional reform, there 
have been few other solutions suggested. Thus, Part VI propounds 
an analytical framework that adequately balances private and gov-
ernmental interests in the digital age—at least when cellular location 
information is involved. 
I.  THE TECHNOLOGY: CELLPHONES, CELL SITES, AND CELL-SITE 
LOCATION INFORMATION 
Undoubtedly, cellphones changed the way people communicate 
by telephone.9 Prior to cellphone use, a person would call a home or 
office with the hope that the recipient was at the place called. Now, 
as Matthew Blaze, a Professor of Computer and Information Science 
                                                                                                             
 7 See discussion infra Parts III, IV, and V. 
 8 Brad Heath, Police secretly track cellphones to solve routine crimes, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/23/balti-
more-police-stingray-cell-surveillance/31994181/. 
 9 See PAUL BEDELL, CELLULAR NETWORKS: DESIGN AND OPERATION—A 
REAL WORLD PERSPECTIVE 14 (2014) [hereinafter BEDELL, CELLULAR 
NETWORKS]; see also infra Part III. 
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at the University of Pennsylvania, puts it, “Rather than thinking 
about the telephone located in a place that we call, we think about 
the person we want to call, because we expect them to have their 
telephone with them.”10 CSLI is the mechanism that allows a cell-
phone to function through a network.11 Like other technologies, the 
technology pertaining to cell-site location information has become 
increasingly more accurate over time. As discussed below, CSLI is 
now able to locate a person within a single room.12 When a call is 
placed or when a text message is sent or received, incidental data is 
also transmitted between a cellphone and the service provider’s cell 
site.13 It is vital to the privacy debate to fully understand CSLI. 
Without understanding how a cellphone transmits its location, any 
analysis of reasonable expectations of privacy in CSLI is fruitless. 
A. Cellphone-to-Cell-Tower Communication 
While travelling on an intestate, most of us have seen a cell 
tower or cell site.14 Cell sites appear either as large metal towers in 
plain view or as poorly disguised trees that dwarf the natural trees 
                                                                                                             
 10 ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Ser-
vices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil 
Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13 (2010) [hereinafter 
June 2010 Hearing] (testimony of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor, University of 
Pennsylvania), http://judiciary.house.gov/_fileshearings/printers/111th/111-
109_57082.PDF. 
 11 For an in-depth discussion of cellular communications, see, for example, 
PAUL BEDELL, WIRELESS CRASH COURSE—A REAL WORLD PERSPECTIVE (3d ed. 
2012) [hereinafter BEDELL, WIRELESS]. See also Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Lo-
cation Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. 
REV. 681, 702–16 (2011) (discussing the breadth and richness of information that 
cellphones communicate to cell towers). 
 12 June 2010 Hearing, supra note 10, at 16. 
 13 See Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 507 n.1 (Fla. 2014) (explaining that 
CSLI is created when a placed call is received). Location information is also given 
off by a cellphone passively. See Thomas Farley & Ken Schmidt, Cellular Tele-
phone Basics, PRIVATELINE (Jan. 1, 2006), www.privateline.com/mt_cellba-
sics/iii_cell_sector_terminology/. 
 14 See En Banc Brief of the United States of America at 8, United States v. 
Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Brief of the United States] (en 
banc). A “Cell Site” is the source of the signal that a cellphone receives, enabling 
the phone to send and receive calls and data. See Farley & Schmidt, supra note 
13. 
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that surround it.15 Alternatively, in urban settings, such as Miami, 
cell sites are generally located on tall buildings.16 Cell sites are aptly 
named because each tower is a site that emanates cellular-signal 
coverage to a corresponding “cell.”17 It may help to think of the cell 
site as the dot in the center of a circle with the cell being the circum-
ference of the geographic area that the circle covers.18 
The size of a cell depends on “terrain, system capacity needs, 
and geographic location—urban or rural.”19 Size also depends on 
the number of users attempting to send or receive data b ecause each 
cell site has a limited amount of information it can transmit between 
users at one time.20 For example, a person who attempts to make a 
call at midnight on New Year’s Eve has likely experienced this phe-
nomenon, where the phone struggles to connect a call.21 This prob-
lem is prevalent in populous areas. Thus, the large population in ur-
ban areas requires cell sizes to be much smaller and more numerous 
to accommodate increased cellular-data traffic.22 This means that 
the area in which a cellphone will connect to a particular cell tower 
is smaller. The coverage of cell sites are “shrinking rapidly” because 
                                                                                                             
 15 BEDELL, WIRELESS, supra note 11, at 14–15. 
 16 Id. at 21.  
 17 A “cell” is the area of coverage that a cell tower provides. See Farley & 
Schmidt, supra note 13. 
 18 A more accepted depiction of a “cell” is that of a triangle or hexagon be-
cause if circles are amassed there would gaps in coverage at the edges whereas 
triangles or hexagons may be neatly placed next to one another without gaps in 
coverage, which allows for call hand-off between cells. This shape is also pre-
ferred because of the use of sectoring. For a graphic illustration, see Farley & 
Schmidt, supra note 13. 
 19 BEDELL, CELLULAR NETWORKS, supra note 9, at 10. 
 20 Id. at 28–32. 
 21 See id. at 10 (“[A]s data becomes more of a driver of site capacity, addi-
tional sites are required to support the capacity needs of the network . . . re-
duc[ing] the coverage area of the sites while adding more sites to the network.”); 
see also BEDELL, WIRELESS, supra note 11, at 11–13. 
 22 See BEDELL, CELLULAR NETWORKS, supra note 10, at 22 (stating that mi-
crocells have a cell radius of less than 1.3 miles and that picocells have a radius 
of only 200 meters); see also BEDELL, WIRELESS, supra note 11, at 27–29 (dis-
cussing the difference in range between macro-, micro-, and pico-cells). 
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of these high traffic demands, thus making CSLI data more precise 
in virtually all environments.23 
One method used by service providers to accommodate in-
creased traffic demands is called “sectoring” or “sectorization.”24 
“In today’s wireless networks, all cell [sites] are sectorized,” which 
allows customers to reap enhanced coverage benefits.25 Sectoring 
breaks one cell site into many cell sites through the use of directional 
antennas.26 Again, imagine a cell site as a dot in the center of a circle. 
Now, imagine that the circle is broken into three or six slices (like a 
pizza). If a cell tower has three sectors, each sector covers a 120-
degree slice of the 360-degree circle; if it is broken into six sectors, 
then each sector covers 60 degrees of the circle. Each slice is a “sec-
tor” that operates under its own frequency and transmits information 
only to and from cellphones within its sector.27 Thus, using its rec-
ords, a cellphone company can determine the sector within which a 
cellphone is located, making location information in sectorized cells 
more accurate.28 
In addition to smaller cell size and sectoring, service providers 
created networks of overlapping cell sites to ensure consistent cov-
erage for its users.29 Overlapping cells allow a device to receive a 
“usable signal” easily as the user moves from one cell site to the 
                                                                                                             
 23 BEDELL, CELLULAR NETWORKS, supra note 9, at 14; see also En Banc Brief 
of Amicus Curiae AT&T Mobility, LCC in Support of Neither Party at 9, United 
States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Brief of AT&T] (en 
banc) (“As the density of the cell towers increases . . . the precision of the CSLI 
increases correspondingly.”). 
 24 BEDELL, WIRELESS, supra note 11, at 113–16. 
 25 Id. at 116 (discussing the benefits of sectoring as minimizing interference 
and increasing capacity of a coverage area). 
 26 Id. at 113–16. 
 27 See BEDELL, CELLULAR NETWORKS, supra note 9, at 90 (stating each sec-
tor operates under its own set of frequencies or channels); see also June 2010 
Hearing, supra note 10, at 24 (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania) (“A sector can handle only a limited number of simulta-
neous call connections given the amount of radio spectrum ‘bandwidth’ allocated 
to the wireless carrier.”). 
 28 June 2010 Hearing, supra note 10, at 26 (statement of Matt Blaze, Asso-
ciate Professor, University of Pennsylvania) (“[I]t has become practical for a net-
work operator to pinpoint a phone’s latitude and longitude at a level of accuracy 
that can approach that of GPS.”). 
 29 See BEDELL, CELLULAR NETWORKS, supra note 9, at 30 (discussing the 
design of cellular networks). 
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next.30 If this were not the case, then each time a user exited a cov-
erage cell, the call would drop. A cellphone automatically transi-
tions from cell site to cell site by passively “monitor[ing] its signal 
levels, and determin[ing] how and when to hand off its transmission 
to an adjacent cell.”31 This “handing off” also occurs among sectors 
within a cell site as the cellphone attempts to maintain the strongest 
signal.32 Thus, overlapping cell sites allow a service provider to as-
certain the path a cell user took by looking to the cell sites and sec-
tors the phone transitioned between along a route. 
Cell sites must know where each cellphone is located so that in-
formation can be transmitted directly to that device and no other de-
vice. This communication between a cell site and cellphone occurs 
because each cellphone has a unique identifier that allows a cell site 
to locate and direct information to that particular cellphone.33 More-
over, cellphones constantly communicate with cell sites through a 
process known as “registration.”34 Registration is the process the 
cellphone undergoes for “call handoff” whereby the cellphone mon-
itors its signal strength and switches to the cell site with the strongest 
connection, and it can occur “every seven seconds.”35 Its purpose is 
to make sure that the cell network properly routes a call or text mes-
sage when the user receives or sends one.36 This self-monitoring of 
                                                                                                             
 30 BEDELL, WIRELESS, supra note 11, at 40. 
 31 BEDELL, CELLULAR NETWORKS, supra note 9, at 32; see also June 2010 
Hearing, supra note 10, at 13 (testimony of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania) (stating that as cellphones move, they “discover the [cell 
site] with the strongest radio signal and perform a registration process identifying 
themselves . . . [and] establishing that the user has a valid cell phone service”). 
 32 See BEDELL, CELLULAR NETWORKS, supra note 9, at 91 (describing each 
sector as having its own coverage area within the cell). 
 33 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POLICY 
GUIDANCE: USE OF CELL-SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY (2015), http://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/file/767321/download [hereinafter USE OF CELL-SITE SIMULATOR 
TECHNOLOGY]. 
 34 See June 2010 Hearing, supra note 10, at 14 (testimony of Matt Blaze, 
Associate Professor, University of Pennsylvania) (stating that without registration 
data, the cell-service provider “won’t know how to get calls to you”). 
 35 See In re U.S. for Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n, 534 F. 
Supp. 2d 585, 590 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (noting that registration “occurs approxi-
mately every seven seconds”), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010); see also 
Farley & Schmidt, supra note 13. 
 36 See Farley & Schmidt, supra note 13. 
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signal strength allows the user to continuously have reception, make 
or receive calls, and use data—all without requiring the user to be 
involved in the process. In effect, self-monitoring creates many 
points at which the phone’s location can be ascertained.37 
In recent years, cellphones became “smartphones” and many us-
ers now access the internet with their cellphones.38 The implications 
of this use on location information are also important to the CSLI 
debate. As the demand for cellphones with internet connectivity in-
creases, the supply of cell sites that can accommodate this use also 
increases.39 By directing more data transmission to each individual 
cellphone, cell sites can accommodate fewer devices. To solve this 
issue, service providers have increasingly relied on the use of “mi-
crocells,” “picocells,” and “femtocells” to increase the amount of 
data that can be processed in a particular area, which allows a cell-
phone to send and receive more information.40 These systems are 
increasingly employed in highly populated areas such as cities, train 
stations, and airports.41 Microcells, initially used as “gap fillers” to 
extend coverage to the small areas between larger cell sites,42 are 
now employed with greater frequency to accommodate the in-
creased demand for internet service.43 Picocells are designed to ac-
commodate smaller areas such as train stations, planes, and office 
                                                                                                             
 37 See Brief of AT&T, supra note 23, at 8 (“At the most basic level, the wire-
less network needs to determine the location of the mobile device in order to send 
and receive communications to and from that device.”); see also id. at 9 (explain-
ing that CSLI is created from voice, text, e-mail, and other data transmissions). 
 38 Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/how-
wireless-works/wireless-quick-facts (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (“Smartphones 
comprise 77% of traffic on wireless networks . . . .”). 
 39 See Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 
(Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-
2015; see also Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/your-
wireless-life/how-wireless-works/annual-wireless-industry-survey (last updated 
June 2015) (data reveals that cell-data usage in America more than doubled be-
tween 2012 and 2014). 
 40 BEDELL, CELLULAR NETWORKS, supra note 9, at 10. 
 41 BEDELL, WIRELESS, supra note 11, at 27–32. 
 42 Id. at 28 (“Microcell[s] . . . can be used to add capacity . . . where there is 
evidence of a very high volume of network traffic.”). 
 43 Id. 
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buildings.44 Picocells have a range of less than 200 meters.45 
Femtocells are used to provide cell service to homes and small busi-
nesses.46 Femtocells have a range of less than ten meters.47 Further, 
Picocells and Femtocells are designed to bring cell service in-
doors;48 therefore, in some instances, they provide cell-site location 
information where GPS location information would be unavailable 
because satellite signals cannot communicate to the cellphone’s an-
tenna when the signal is blocked.49 Location information derived 
from these systems can provide information that is accurate within 
thirty feet of a person’s location.50 
Not only is cell-site location information becoming precise, but 
also many service providers store CSLI for business purposes in the 
form of call records.51 Call records include the “identity of the cell 
sector that handled” the call and “may include even more detailed 
information such as registration data or the cellular telephone user’s 
latitude and longitude.”52 Although each provider has its own reten-
tion policies, many providers store “call detail records,” which may 
                                                                                                             
 44 Id. at 29. 
 45 Id.; see BEDELL, CELLULAR NETWORKS, supra note 9, at 23. 
 46 BEDELL, WIRELESS, supra note 11, at 30. 
 47 BEDELL, CELLULAR NETWORKS, supra note 9, at 24. 
 48 BEDELL, WIRELESS, supra note 11, at 27–32. 
 49 Id. at 27–29. 
 50 BEDELL, CELLULAR NETWORKS, supra note 9, at 24; see also Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (Part II): Geolocation Privacy and erance: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., & Investi-
gations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 33 (2013) [hereinafter 
April 2013 Hearing] (statement of Catherine Crump, Staff Attorney, American 
Civil Liberties Union) (“[C]ellular towers now may cover an area as small as a 
tunnel, a subway, a specific roadway, a particular floor of a building, or even an 
individual home or office.”). 
 51 Steven Nelson, Here’s How Long Cellphone Companies Store Your Call 
Records, U.S. NEWS (May 22, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/ar-
ticles/2015/05/22/how-long-cellphone-companies-store-your-call-records (stat-
ing that service providers store call records between zero and ten years depending 
on the provider). 
 52 Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 854 n.19 (Mass. 2014) (citing 
April 2013 Hearing, supra note 50, at 57 (statement of Matt Blaze, Professor, 
University of Pennsylvania). 
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“include the most accurate location information available to them” 
and might even encompass the latitude and longitude of the phone.53 
Cellphone users now stream music and movies, make calls, send 
photos and e-mails, check the weather, get directions, and upload 
data. Performing these activities have forced cell sites to shrink. 
CSLI is more precise and more revealing of intimate details of one’s 
daily activities than ever before.54 With this understanding of the 
technology behind CSLI, an inquiry into privacy expectations can 
now be had. 
II.   THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS: PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS, 
THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE, AND STATUTES 
A. Privacy Expectations 
Privacy expectations under the Fourth Amendment evolve with 
society.55 Originally, a “search” occurred only if the government 
                                                                                                             
 53 April 2013 Hearing, supra note 50, at 57 (statement of Matt Blaze, Profes-
sor, University of Pennsylvania). 
 54 See June 2010 Hearing, supra note 10, at 16 (testimony of Matt Blaze, 
Associate Professor, University of Pennsylvania) (noting that “as we have moved 
toward very small sector locations,” it has become easier to determine a cellphone 
user’s exact location); see also Annual Wireless Industry Survey, supra note 39 
(revealing that cell-data usage in America more than doubled between 2012 and 
2014). 
 55 For a thoughtful history of the circumstances surrounding the evolution of 
the Fourth Amendment, see Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth 
Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 
247, 257 (2016) (“By design, therefore, a paramount purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment was to serve as a guardian of individual liberty and free expres-
sion.”). A few cases decided by the Supreme Court illustrate this point. See Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (holding that compelling a man to produce 
his papers was a search under the Fourth Amendment), overruled by Warden v. 
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 
(1928) (“The language of the [Fourth A]mendment cannot be extended and ex-
panded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from the defend-
ant’s house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or office, any 
more than are the highways along which they are stretched.”), overruled in part 
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (expanding protections beyond 
trespass to constitutionally protected areas and including reasonable expectations 
of privacy); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) (“The Katz reason-
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trespassed on a constitutionally protected area: “persons,” “houses,” 
“papers,” and “effects.”56 Generally, it appears that the Supreme 
Court had little difficulty distinguishing private matters within the 
home from public matters outside of the home.57 But, in 1967, the 
Supreme Court blurred this distinction by protecting privacy rights 
beyond constitutionally enumerated areas.58 In Katz v. United 
States, the Supreme Court uprooted the classic trespass theory of 
Fourth Amendment protections by extending Fourth Amendment 
protection to “people, not places.”59 From then on, a person’s Fourth 
Amendment rights would no longer rely solely on trespass theory. 
Instead, these protections would be assessed both under trespass the-
ory and by a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy beyond con-
stitutionally protected areas.60 
                                                                                                             
able-expectations test ‘has been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional prop-
erty-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment . . . .” (quoting United States 
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012))). 
 56 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (holding that a person has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in communications that are heard beyond the walls of one’s 
home when the government uses a wiretap); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV 
(“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”). 
 57 See, e.g., Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438; Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 
134 (1942) (holding that use of a “detectaphone” placed against an adjoining wall 
to hear conversations on the other side did not constitute a search), overruled in 
part by Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 507 
(1961) (holding a search unconstitutional when government affixed a “spike mic” 
to apartment’s heating conduit, allowing them to eavesdrop on conversations); id. 
at 509–10 (noting that “[e]avesdropping accomplished by means of such a physi-
cal intrusion” violated the Fourth Amendment); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41, 59 (1967) (striking down a New York wiretapping statute and stating that 
“[d]uring such a long and continuous (24 hours a day) period the conversations of 
any and all persons coming into the area covered by the device will be seized 
indiscriminately and without regard to their connection with the crime under in-
vestigation”). 
 58 See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
 59 Id. at 351. 
 60 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
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Since Katz, the Supreme Court has articulated some guidance on 
what is a reasonable expectation of privacy.61 A person has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy on public roads.62 Nor is there a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in open fields.63 Nor does a person 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy when technology in “gen-
eral public use” reveals intimacies of his home.64 But, whether a 
person maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
aggregated from the long-term monitoring of his movements with-
out affecting a trespass remains unanswered.65 In 2013, the Supreme 
Court hinted that the inquiry into reasonable expectations of privacy 
does not turn on what “information a hypothetical third person” may 
learn, but rather what “a person generally expects from third par-
ties.”66 
                                                                                                             
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘rea-
sonable.’”). 
 61 See Price, supra note 55, at 262 n.110 (collecting cases discussing reason-
able expectations of privacy as applied to digital technology). 
 62 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding no reason-
able expectation of privacy when defendant drove on public roads because police 
officer following defendant would reveal the same information). 
 63 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178–80 (1984) (finding no rea-
sonable expectation in open fields, which are areas beyond the home and its cur-
tilage). 
 64 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“[O]btaining by sense-en-
hancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could 
not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitution-
ally protected area[]’ . . . constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the tech-
nology in question is not in general public use.” (quoting Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
 65 In Jones, the majority held that the case was decided on the trespass theory; 
however, at least five Justices, in scattered concurrences, also stated their dis-
pleasure with long-term monitoring. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring in part) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring 
in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”). 
 66 See State v. Tate, 849 N.W.2d 798, 806 n.13 (Wis. 2014) (“‘[I]ntroducing 
a trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering 
incriminating evidence’ constitutes a search because it is not part of a ‘customary 
invitation’ to attempt entry . . . .” (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 
1416 (2013)). 
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In this light, the Supreme Court’s tracking-technology decisions 
help guide our understanding of what is reasonable in the CSLI con-
text.67 The Supreme Court analyzed the reasonableness of tracking-
device technology in United States v. Knotts, where the government 
placed a tracking device inside a barrel and tracked it through public 
roads to a cabin.68 In analyzing the privacy implications of the use 
of the tracking device without a warrant, the Court began with the 
assertion that a person’s expectation of privacy must be “justifia-
ble,” “reasonable,” or “legitimate.”69 The Court found that the gov-
ernment did not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy by 
monitoring the barrel within an automobile, even remotely, on the 
public road to the cabin because the police could have obtained the 
same information by following defendant’s vehicle.70 It is important 
to note that Knotts did not challenge the fixation of the tracking de-
vice to the barrel.71 Thus, the court did not expound on a trespass 
theory. This issue arose again in United States v. Karo, where the 
facts resembled those of Knotts, except that, in Karo, the govern-
ment continued to track the barrel once it was inside the defendant’s 
home.72 The Court built a privacy fence at the entrance of one’s 
home: 
We cannot accept the Government’s contention that 
it should be completely free from the constraints of 
the Fourth Amendment to determine by means of an 
electronic device, without a warrant and without 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a 
                                                                                                             
 67 See generally Knotts, 460 U.S. 276; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 
(1984); Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27; Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
 68 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277–80. 
 69 Id. at 280. 
 70 Id. at 282 (“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from 
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhance-
ment as science and technology afforded them in this case.”). 
 71 Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I think this would have been a much 
more difficult case if respondent had challenged, not merely certain aspects of the 
monitoring of the beeper installed in the chloroform container purchased by re-
spondent’s compatriot, but also its original installation.”). 
 72 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 716. 
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particular article—or a person, for that matter—is in 
an individual’s home at a particular time.73 
Then, in Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court emphasized 
that a person’s home is not completely free from remote monitor-
ing.74 Instead, only information about the intimacies of one’s home 
obtained through the use of technology not in general public use is 
prohibited.75 Eleven years later, the Court revisited its tracking-de-
vice precedent in United States v. Jones.76 In Jones, the government 
affixed a tracking device to the defendant’s vehicle without a war-
rant and without a valid court order.77 The government tracked the 
vehicle remotely for twenty-eight days.78 The Supreme Court deter-
mined that the government trespassed on Jones’s property and, thus, 
held narrowly, leaving undecided whether the long-term monitoring 
of the location of Jones’s vehicle constituted a search.79 It was the 
Jones decision that reinvigorated the trespass theory of privacy pro-
tections.80 
                                                                                                             
 73 Id. (emphasis added). 
 74 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 75 Id. (holding that government’s use of a thermal imaginer revealing intima-
cies of one’s home violated Fourth Amendment because the device was not in 
general public use). 
 76 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 77 See id. at 948. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 954 (“We may have to grapple with these ‘vexing problems’ in some 
future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be 
had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them 
here.”); id. at 953 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic 
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”). 
 80 See Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance 
After United States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 808–10 (2013) [hereinafter Real-Time and His-
toric Location Surveillance] (“[W]e have two conceptions of Fourth Amendment 
search, both of which were satisfied, but no answer as to what law enforcement 
must know or do before conducting that search.”); see also Stephen E. Henderson, 
After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 
14 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 431, 458 (2013) [hereinafter After United States v. Jones] 
(“Jones can be read as a return to the more flexible approach of Katz, which is 
more likely to get the ‘right’ result in a particular case, even if it also leaves the 
doctrine a bit nebulous for future cases.”). 
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B. The Third-Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine has a significant impact on a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.81 Until 1976, the cases discussing 
the third-party doctrine involved undercover agents and government 
informants.82 Then, in United States v. Miller, the Court extended 
the doctrine to business records held by third parties.83 In Miller, a 
subpoena directed Miller’s banking institution to disclose his bank-
ing records to the government.84 The district court held this consti-
tuted a seizure and stated that the subpoena compelled the “produc-
tion of a man’s private papers.”85 The Supreme Court affirmed the 
appellate court’s reversal, holding that the documents were not Mil-
ler’s “private papers” because the banking institution was a party to 
the documents and thus no trespass occurred.86 In rejecting any rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the documents, the Court crafted 
an ad hoc inquiry to determine whether a person holds a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in documents controlled by third parties: “We 
must examine the nature of the particular documents sought to be 
protected in order to determine whether there is a legitimate ‘expec-
tation of privacy’ concerning their contents.”87 
Three years later, the Supreme Court performed this ad hoc in-
quiry in Smith v. Maryland, where it relied on Miller and determined 
that the numbers recorded from a pen register installed by a tele-
phone company at the request of law enforcement was not a search 
                                                                                                             
 81 For discussions regarding the development of the third-party doctrine, see 
Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 
566–71 (2009). See also RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R43586, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 7–11 (2014). 
 82 See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753 (1952) (holding that no 
search occurred because the defendant voluntarily communicated plans to the un-
dercover agent); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963) (holding that 
recorded statements made to IRS agent were not unlawfully obtained); Lewis v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966) (holding no Fourth Amendment violation 
when defendant invited undercover agent into home); see also Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293, 301–03 (1966) (holding no search occurred when defendant 
revealed incriminating information to another). 
 83 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 84 Id. at 438. 
 85 Id. at 438–39 (citing Boyd v. United States 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886)). 
 86 Id. at 440–41. 
 87 Id. at 442. 
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under the Fourth Amendment.88 The Court, relying on Katz, deter-
mined that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the phone numbers he dials.89 The Court essentially based its hold-
ing on three key facts: (1) the limited capabilities of pen registers to 
merely record numbers, (2) public advertising indicating that tele-
phone companies may use pen registers to record the numbers dialed 
by customers, and (3) the fact that customers voluntarily communi-
cate the numbers dialed to phone companies with these capabili-
ties.90 Thus, the Court concluded that Smith “voluntarily conveyed” 
and “exposed” to the phone company the numbers he dialed, which 
were subsequently recorded by the pen register, thereby removing 
his reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.91 Pres-
ently, the third-party doctrine eliminates a person’s claim to a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy: 
It is well settled that when an individual reveals pri-
vate information to another, he assumes the risk that 
his confidant will reveal that information to the au-
thorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit governmental use of that infor-
mation. Once frustration of the original expectation 
of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit governmental use of the now nonprivate in-
formation . . . .92 
C. Statutes 
The brass-tacks inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is whether 
a search occurred and, if so, whether the government performed it 
reasonably.93 “The reasonableness of a search depends on the total-
ity of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the 
                                                                                                             
 88 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 738 (1979); Id. at 745. 
 89 Id. at 745. 
 90 See id. at 742. 
 91 Id. at 744. 
 92 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment is not implicated if the Government does not exceed scope of 
the search performed by a non-government third party). 
 93 See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (noting that the 
“touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness); see also United States 
v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 522 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Jordan, J., concurring) 
2016] CELLPHONES, STINGRAYS, AND SEARCHES! AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
LEGALITY OF CELLULAR LOCATION INFORMATION 1269 
 
search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable 
privacy expectations.”94 In the context of federal statutes, there is a 
“strong presumption of constitutionality due to an Act of Congress, 
especially when it turns on what is ‘reasonable.’”95 Thus, it is not 
surprising that the government has aggressively requested access to 
CSLI under the guise of statutory permissibility.96 
1. THE SCA AND HISTORICAL CELL-SITE LOCATION 
INFORMATION 
The statute relied on most often is the Stored Communications 
Act (“SCA”). The SCA was one of many extension to the Commu-
nications Act, which provides basic privacy rights for consumers by 
requiring all communications carriers “to protect the confidentiality 
of proprietary information of, and relating to . . . [its] custom-
ers . . . .”97 Originally, Congress passed the Communications Act in 
response to Justice Taft’s decision in Olmstead v. United States.98 
                                                                                                             
(stating that even if a search occurred, the search was reasonable because of the 
procedures set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012)). 
 94 Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015), quoted in Davis, 
785 F.3d at 522 (Jordan, J., concurring). 
 95 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416 (1976), quoted in Davis, 785 
F.3d at 523 (Jordan, J., concurring); see also United States v. Carpenter, No. 14-
1572, 2016 WL 1445183, at *7 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 2016) (noting that “society it-
self—in the form of its elected representatives in Congress—has already struck a 
balance” on the reasonableness of privacy expectations in CSLI through 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d)). 
 96 Judge Smith conservatively estimated that, in 2006, the “number of elec-
tronic surveillance orders issued at the federal level . . . substantially exceed[ed] 
10,000.” June 2010 Hearing, supra note 10, at 80 (statement of Stephen Wm. 
Smith, United States Magistrate Judge, Southern District of Texas); see also Real-
Time and Historic Location Surveillance, supra note 80, at 810 (“[L]aw enforce-
ment requested some information from cell phone providers over 1.3 million 
times in 2011 . . . .”). 
 97 47 U.S.C. § 222(a) (1934). 
 98 See Howard J. Kaplan et al., The History and Law of Wiretapping, 3 
AMERICANBAR.ORG (Apr. 18–20 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/-
dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/sac_2012/29-1_his-
tory_and_law_of_wiretapping.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (“[O]ne who installs in his house a telephone 
instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite out-
side, and that the wires beyond his house, and messages while passing over them, 
are not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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Years later, Congress passed the Wiretap Act.99 In doing so, Con-
gress placed significant limitations on the circumstances under 
which a wiretap may be used to obtain information due to a wire-
tap’s ability to record content and non-content information.100 Ap-
plications for “[w]iretaps are often referred to as ‘super-warrants’ 
because of the additional requirements beyond probable cause nec-
essary for their issuance.”101 Notably, the Wiretap Act limits the use 
                                                                                                             
 99 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (1968). 
 100 See id. § 2518; see also Kaplan et al, supra note 98, at 4–5 (discussing that 
Congress enacted a new wiretap statute after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Katz); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 
82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522) (“In order to pro-
tect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications, to protect the integ-
rity of court and administrative proceedings, and to prevent the obstruction of in-
terstate commerce, it is necessary for Congress to define on a uniform basis the 
circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral com-
munications may be authorized . . . .”). 
 101 In re U.S. for and Order, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 573 (W.D. Tex. 2010). The 
requirements for an application for a wiretap are as follows: 
(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a 
wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter shall be made in writ-
ing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state 
the applicant’s authority to make such application. Each application shall include 
the following information: 
(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making the appli-
cation, and the officer authorizing the application; 
(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by 
the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, including (i) de-
tails as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, 
(ii) except as provided in subsection (11), a particular description of the nature 
and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is 
to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of communications 
sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing the 
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted; 
(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative proce-
dures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to 
succeed if tried or to be too dangerous; 
(d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be 
maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such that the authorization for 
interception should not automatically terminate when the described type of com-
munication has been first obtained, a particular description of facts establishing 
probable cause to believe that additional communications of the same type will 
occur thereafter; 
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of a wiretap to a thirty-day period before another request must be 
made.102 
Subsequently, Congress enacted the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act (“ECPA”).103 While the Wiretap Act covered only 
“wire” and “oral” communications,104 the ECPA purportedly regu-
lates all electronic communications.105 The ECPA introduced provi-
sions regulating the use of pen registers and trap-and-trace de-
vices.106 Both pen registers and trap-and-trace devices can be au-
thorized by court order if the information sought is “relevant to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.”107 Like a wiretap, a pen register or 
trap-and-trace device may only be used for a limited duration before 
seeking judicial re-approval.108 
                                                                                                             
(e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications 
known to the individual authorizing and making the application, made to any 
judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval of interceptions of, wire, oral, 
or electronic communications involving any of the same persons, facilities or 
places specified in the application, and the action taken by the judge on each such 
application; and 
(f) where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement setting forth 
the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of 
the failure to obtain such results. 
18 U.S.C. § 2518(1). 
 102 See 18 U.S.C § 2518(5). 
 103 In re U.S. for Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n, 534 F. Supp. 
2d 585, 593 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (noting that the ECPA was a “major overhaul” of 
the Wiretap Act of 1968), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 104 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522). 
 105 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510–22, JUSTICE INFO. SHARING, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (July 30, 2013), 
https://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1285 (“The ECPA, as 
amended, protects wire, oral, and electronic communications . . . .”). 
 106 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127; see also id. § 3127(3) (defining “pen regis-
ter” as “a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, 
or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a 
wire or electronic communication is transmitted”); id. § 3127(4) (defining “trap 
and trace device” as a “device or process which captures the incoming electronic 
or other impulses which identify the originating number”). 
 107 See id. § 3123(a)(1). 
 108 See id. § 3123(c). The ECPA was amended further by the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”) to prevent the disclosure of a 
subscriber’s location information when the use of a pen register or trap-and-trace 
1272 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
 
Shortly after, Congress passed the SCA to regulate the disclo-
sure of electronic information stored by third parties.109 These pro-
visions, however, are not clear.110 For example, the SCA has multi-
ple provisions allowing for the disclosure of the same stored com-
munications. Under subsection (c)(1)(A), the SCA allows disclosure 
of communication information upon the issuance of a warrant based 
on probable cause.111 However, subsection (c)(1)(B) refers the 
reader to subsection (d) of the same provision, which states that a 
court “shall issue” an order directing a cell-service provider to dis-
close electronic communications only if the government “offers spe-
cific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that the . . . records or other information sought[] are rel-
evant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”112 The 
standard of proof of subsection (c)(1)(A), probable cause, and that 
of subsection (c)(1)(B), relevance to an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion, are clearly different. Thus, the government can obtain the same 
type of stored electronic information with a showing of probable 
                                                                                                             
device is authorized. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (stating that information obtained 
using a pen register or trap-and-trace device “shall not include any information 
that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber (except to the extent that 
the location may be determined from the telephone number)”). 
 109 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712. 
 110 Compare id. § 2703(c) (“Records concerning electronic communication 
service or remote computing service – (1) A governmental entity may require a 
provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service to dis-
close a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of 
such service (not including the contents of the communications) only when the 
government entity – (A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described 
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued 
using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction; (B) obtains 
a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section; or (C) has 
the consent of the subscriber or consumer to such disclosure . . . .”), with id. 
§ 2703(d) (“Requirements for Court Order – A court order for disclosure under 
subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that is a court of competent ju-
risdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and artic-
ulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents 
of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, 
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”). 
 111 Id. § 2703(c)(1)(A). 
 112 Id. § 2703(d). 
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cause or a lesser showing of specific and articulable facts.113 Why 
would law enforcement ever seek to satisfy the probable cause 
standard under subsection (c)(1)(A) if it can obtain the same stored 
communications under a relevance standard of subsection 
(c)(1)(B)?114 
This language has unsurprisingly led to confusion.115 Some 
courts hold that the SCA expressly regulates the disclosure of CSLI 
to the government.116 These courts reason that the SCA regulates the 
access of “stored” communications, and section (c) states that the 
government may “require” a service provider to disclose a cus-
tomer’s records or “other information pertaining to a sub-
scriber . . . .”117 Thus, the government considers CSLI to be “other 
information,” and the SCA merely requires the government to meet 
                                                                                                             
 113 See In re U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 707 F.3d 283, 
287 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that the standard under § 2703(d) is “essentially a 
reasonable suspicion standard”); In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 
600, 606 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The ‘specific and articulable facts’ standard is a lesser 
showing than the probable cause standard that is required by the Fourth Amend-
ment to obtain a warrant.”). 
 114 For a discussion of the different standards, see Stephanie K. Pell & Chris-
topher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards for Law 
Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 117, 151–57 (2012). See also Freiwald, supra note 11, at 697 (“The D 
order standard, then, permits much broader inquiries into a much wider range of 
targets.”). 
 115 In Re U.S. for Order Directing a Prov. of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose 
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e are stymied by the 
failure of Congress to make its intention clear.”). 
 116 See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 615 (“[A]s long as 
the Government meets the statutory requirements, the SCA does not give the mag-
istrate judge discretion to deny the Government’s application for such an order.”); 
see also In re U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d), 
509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding that HCSLI “clearly satisfies” 
the requirements under § 2703(c) and, thus, an order was appropriate); In re 
Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013) (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in cellphone location); 
United States v. Madison, No. 11-60285, 2012 WL 3095357, at *9 (S.D. Fla. July 
30, 2012) (Rosenbaum, J.) (holding Fourth Amendment was not implicated under 
third-party doctrine); In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing Use of a Pen Register, 
2009 WL 159187, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2009) (finding that a “cell phone falls 
squarely within the statutory definition of the term ‘tracking device’”). 
 117 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c). 
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the criteria set forth in § 2703(d).118 To satisfy § 2703(d) a court 
must decide whether the holder of the record is a “provider” of elec-
tronic communications, whether CSLI is a stored “record,” and 
whether CSLI is content or non-content information.119 
As I did with the technology behind CSLI, threshold questions 
of the definitions used by the SCA and how CSLI fits those defini-
tions must be addressed. For starters, the SCA encompasses all rec-
ords concerning electronic communication services.120 It defines 
“electronic communication services” as including “wire or elec-
tronic communications.”121 A “wire communication” is defined as 
“any aural transfer” made through the use of the wires.122 An “aural 
transfer” is a communication that contains the “human voice.”123 An 
“electronic communication” is “any transfer” of data transmitted by 
“wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical sys-
tem that affects interstate or foreign commerce . . . .”124 The defini-
tion of “electronic communication” also explicitly excludes any 
“communication” from a “tracking device (as defined in section 
3117 of this title) . . . .”125 Comparatively, there is no exclusion for 
tracking-device communications under the definition of wire com-
munications. The complicating element of CSLI is that it can be cre-
ated from both wire and electronic communications. For example, 
when a call is made or received, the communication falls under a 
wire communication because it involves the human voice. But, a text 
                                                                                                             
 118 See In re U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d), 
509 F. Supp. 2d at 79–80. 
 119 Id. The content-versus-non-content debate regarding CSLI was articulated 
in the En Banc Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers in Support of Appellant Quartavious Davis at 20, United States v. 
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 505 (11th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-12928). See also Freiwald, 
supra note 11, at 740–43 (explaining that Smith did not create a rule allowing non-
content disclosure). 
 120 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c). 
 121 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14). 
 122 See id. § 2510(1) (defining “wire communication” as “any aural transfer 
made in whole or in part through the use of . . . wire, cable, or other like connec-
tion”). 
 123 See id. § 2510(18). 
 124 Id. § 2510(12). 
 125 Compare id. § 2510(1) (no exclusion of tracking devices), with id. 
§ 2510(12) (noting that electronic communication excludes “any communication 
from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this title)”). 
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message or other non-aural communications falls under the defini-
tion of electronic communication. Thus, if a cellphone is character-
ized as a tracking device, then the SCA cannot be a vehicle for ob-
taining records of CSLI created from the electronic communica-
tions; however, the SCA can be used to obtain the records for CSLI 
from wire communications. At this point, the discussion of the def-
initions is merely to illustrate the potential complications with ap-
plying the SCA to CSLI. 
2. THE HYBRID THEORY AND PROSPECTIVE CELL-SITE 
LOCATION INFORMATION 
In addition to requesting from service providers the location in-
formation they store, the government also requests that location in-
formation of a target cellphone be disclosed at some time in the fu-
ture. This type of tracking information is termed Prospective Cell-
Site Location Information (“PCSLI”). To obtain this information, 
the government combines statutes to facilitate the search.126 This 
“Hybrid Theory” has had limited success in the courts.127 
The Hybrid Theory combines provisions of the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”), the pen-register 
statute, and the SCA.128 Under this theory, the government argues 
that the pen-register statute—18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)—authorizes it to 
record “signaling information” from a user’s phone, including 
CSLI.129 Unfortunately for the government, the CALEA prohibits 
the disclosure of call-identifying information that “may disclose the 
                                                                                                             
 126 See United States v. Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (S.D. Cal. 2013) 
(describing PCSLI as “the acquisition of data for a period of time going forward 
from the date of the order” (emphasis in original)). 
 127 See id. at 1035 (stating “the majority of federal courts examining . . . 
[PCSLI] mandate that the government make a showing of probable cause”); see 
also In re U.S. for Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose 
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 310 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010) (collecting cases dis-
cussing hybrid theory). 
 128 See In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register and 
Trap and Trace Devices, 632 F. Supp. 2d 202, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing 
the statutes selected and utilized by the government to argue that PCSLI is con-
stitutional); see also In re App. for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell 
Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 129 See In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register and 
Trap and Trace Devices, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 205. 
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physical location of the subscriber” when a pen register or trap-and-
trace device is used.130 By itself, this limitation prevents the disclo-
sure of a user’s location information or, in the case of a cellphone, 
CSLI. To get around this limitation, the government relies on provi-
sions from the SCA to allow service providers to disclose CSLI as 
“other information” when the standards previously discussed are 
met.131 The government merely argues that PCSLI is a type of “other 
information” and relies on the SCA. Other courts, however, recog-
nize that the SCA cannot apply to PCSLI.132 These courts reason 
that because CSLI “permits the tracking of the movement of a per-
son or object,” it turns the phone into a tracking device, which re-
quires a warrant.133 Further, with a tracking device, a judge must 
                                                                                                             
 130 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a). 
 131 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
 132 See id. § 3117; see also In re Order Authorizing Prospective and Continu-
ous Release of Cell Site Location Records, 31 F. Supp. 3d 889, 900 (S.D. Tex. 
2014) (holding that SCA is not a vehicle for obtaining prospective CSLI); In re 
U.S. for Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records 
to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 310 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that CSLI is not a tracking 
device because CSLI is a wire communication and, thus, not an electronic com-
munication under which tracking devices are excluded). During the legislative 
hearings, one party commented that the definition of “tracking device” is broad 
enough that it could be “read as including . . . cellular equipment.” Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
99th Cong. 99 (1985) (statement of John Stanton, Chairman Telocator Network 
of America), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/04/29/-
hear-50-1985.pdf. 
 133 See In re Order Authorizing Prospective and Continuous Release of Cell 
Site Location, 31 F. Supp. 3d 889, 896 (S.D. Tex. 2014); In re U.S. for Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d at 310; see also In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen 
Register with Caller Identification Device Cell Site Location Auth. on a Cellular 
Tel., 2009 WL 159187, at *6, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2009) (unpublished); In re 
U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace 
Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 396 
F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); United States v. White II, 62 F. Supp. 3d 614, 
624–26 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (Nov. 24, 2014) (holding that a cellphone becomes a 
tracking device when request is filed and need for “installation” becomes super-
fluous when records are requested). But see United States v. Booker, 2013 WL 
2903562, at *1, *10 (N.D. Ga. June 13, 2013) (“The general nature of the location 
information sought by the government here—merely the cell towers and sectors 
used during each call—does not bring it into the realm of Fourth Amendment 
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limit the monitoring to forty-five days.134 Yet, there is no temporal 
limitation within the SCA. Thus, it seems illogical for Congress to 
enact strict regulations for location information from a physically 
applied tracking device, but have no similar regulation when that 
same information is obtained by merely requesting it from a third 
party. If the SCA allows the disclosure of CSLI, then the SCA has 
superseded the Wiretap Act. 
However, if we go back to the definitional status of CSLI, it may 
be too broad to consider all cellphone communications to be “track-
ing device” communications.135 As discussed previously, a literal 
reading of the SCA and its definitions means that a cellphone is not 
a tracking device when a “wire communication” is involved, but it 
is a tracking device when an “electronic communication” is in-
volved.136 Importantly, deciphering which CSLI data point is the re-
sult of an electronic communication versus a wire communication 
occurs only after the information has been disclosed by the third 
party. Thus, there is no way to know which information is protected 
until after the information is disclosed to the government, unless the 
service provider is required to pre-screen information. 
With technological improvements and the “world’s most effec-
tive tracking device”137 within five feet of a person at any given 
time,138 it is unlikely that the government will seek to physically af-
fix a tracking device when the same—if not better—location infor-
                                                                                                             
protection.”); In re Smartphone Geo. Data App., 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 149–50 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that a cellphone does not meet the definition of “track-
ing device” under 18 U.S.C. § 3117). 
 134 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(C). 
 135 See In re U.S. for Order PCSLI on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. 
Supp. 2d 448, 460 n.55 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that “if a cell phone is a tracking 
device by virtue of the fact that it provides cell site information, then all infor-
mation provided by a cell phone to a cell phone service provider . . . fall[s] outside 
of the scope of ‘electronic communication’”). 
 136 Compare 18 U.S.C § 2510(1), with id. § 2510(12). 
 137 See White II, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 625 (quoting JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET 
NATION 141 (2014)); see also United States v. Jones, 123 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 138 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (“[N]early three-
quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of their phones most of 
the time . . . .”). 
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mation is available under the lesser burden of “specific and articu-
lable facts.”139 If the statutes apply, then CSLI, which is arguably 
more invasive than information gathered using traditional tracking 
devices, is authorized (1) on a lesser showing than probable cause, 
(2) for an undetermined amount of time, and (3) without any provi-
sions requiring judicial renewal.140 
III.   REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY IN CSLI 
A. Privacy Expectations and CSLI 
Having reviewed the technology behind CSLI and the statutory 
regimes, an analysis of the privacy expectations in CSLI can now 
occur. To have a reasonable expectation of privacy, (1) a person 
must subjectively believe that his activity or information is private, 
and (2) society must recognize that belief as “legitimate,” “justifia-
ble,” or “reasonable.”141 Despite scholars arguing that judges have 
historically been bad predictors of what society expects as reasona-
ble,142 many arguments for and against a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in CSLI have been proffered. Specifically, the Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have addressed this issue 
and have failed to reach a consensus.143 Likewise, state supreme 
                                                                                                             
 139 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d); see also 2014 Wiretap Report: Intercept Applications 
Down Slightly (July 1, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2015/07/01/2014-
wiretap-report-intercept-applications-down-slightly (finding wiretap applications 
decreased by 1% from 2013 to 2014). 
 140 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703, with FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(C). 
 141 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280 (1983). 
 142 See Price, supra note 55, at 263 (“Empirical studies have also demonstrated 
that the Supreme Court is at best unreliable when it comes to determining the 
actual privacy expectations of the average person.”). 
 143 See In re U.S. for Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to 
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 310 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Graham 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, 624 F. App’x 75; 
In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that HCSLI is covered under the plain text of the SCA); United States v. Davis, 
785 F.3d 498, 505 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc); United States v. Carpenter, No. 14-
1572, 2016 WL 1445183, at *7 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 2016). 
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courts that have addressed the issue fail to agree on the rationale as 
to why a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI exists.144 
The trouble, of course, is in determining exactly what privacy 
expectation exists in CSLI and whether the third-party doctrine vi-
tiates that expectation. Courts performing the Katz test disagree on 
whether society is willing to recognize a justifiable privacy interest 
in CSLI.145 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s decision in In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data to 
determine that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
CSLI.146 The Fifth Circuit claimed that all cellphone users under-
stand that a “cell phone must send a signal to a nearby tower” to 
make or receive a call.147 The Eleventh Circuit concurred, reasoning 
that “users when making or receiving calls are necessarily convey-
ing or exposing to their service provider their general location within 
that cell tower’s range, and that cell phone companies make records 
of cell-tower usage.”148 
Courts holding to the contrary reason that the fact that a user 
knows his cellphone communicates with cell sites “does not mean 
that the user is consenting to use of that location information by third 
parties for any other unrelated purposes.”149 As the Florida Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 144 See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846 (Mass. 2014); see also 
State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J. 2013); State v. Tate, 849 N.W.2d 798, 813 (Wis. 
2014) (avoiding reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry because judge’s order 
supported issuance on probable cause standard). 
 145 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). Compare Davis, 785 F.3d at 511–13 (holding no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in CSLI), United States v. Madison, No. 11-60285, 2012 WL 3095357, at 
*8 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2012), United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 
2012) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in data voluntarily conveyed 
by phone), and In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th 
Cir. 2013) (same), with Graham, 796 F.3d at 344 (holding reasonable expectation 
of privacy exists in CSLI), Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) 
(same), and In re U.S. for Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to 
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 146 See 724 F.3d at 613–14 (finding no reasonable expectations of privacy in 
CSLI). 
 147 In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 613 (holding no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in HCSLI because information is business record 
of service provider). 
 148 Davis, 785 F.3d at 511. 
 149 Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 522. 
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Court put it, “Requiring a cell phone user to turn off the cell phone 
just to assure privacy from governmental intrusion . . . places an un-
reasonable burden on the user to forego necessary use of his cell 
phone, a device now considered essential by much of the popu-
lace.”150 Furthering the argument that a cellphone is a necessity, us-
ers have begun to disconnect landlines in favor of their cell-
phones,151 and research suggests society has an expectation of pri-
vacy in their location information.152 
Evidencing this point are statements by Supreme Court Justices, 
holdings of state supreme courts, and legislation passed by some 
states. In 2010, the Supreme Court stated that the pervasiveness of 
cellphone use “might strengthen the case for an expectation of pri-
vacy.”153 In fact, ninety percent of U.S. households use wireless cell 
service.154 Further, in Riley v. California, the Supreme Court ex-
pressed concern over the privacy infringements that HCSLI can im-
pose: “Historic location information is a standard feature on many 
smart phones and can reconstruct someone’s specific movements 
                                                                                                             
 150 Id. at 523; see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“It is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practical 
matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.”). 
 151 From 2003 to 2013, families with only wireless phone service increased 
from less than 5% to almost 40%. See Stephen J. Blumberg & Julian V. Luke, 
Wireless Substitution: Early Release of Estimates From the National Health In-
terview Survey, July–December 2013, NAT’L HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY EARLY 
RELEASE PROGRAM (July 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyre-
lease/wireless201407.pdf. 
 152 See Lauren E. Babst, Note, No More Shortcuts: Protect Cell Site Location 
Data with a Warrant Requirement, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 
378–79 (2015) (collecting PEW research studies suggesting the amount of privacy 
society expects in location information and cellphone use); see also Public Per-
ceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 
(Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-percep-
tions/pi_2014-11-12_privacy-perceptions_03/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (sug-
gesting fifty percent of adults surveyed believed the details of their physical loca-
tion over time were very sensitive information); Davis, 785 F.3d at 538 (Martin, 
J., dissenting) (“82% of adults ‘feel as though the details of their physical location 
gathered over a period of time’ is ‘very sensitive . . . .’”). 
 153 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010). 
 154 Wireless Quick Facts, supra note 38. 
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down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particu-
lar building.”155 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to express an opinion on 
CSLI, the state supreme courts of Massachusetts, Florida, and New 
Jersey have held that law enforcement’s warrantless request for 
CSLI violated their respective state constitutions.156 In 2014 alone, 
nine states passed legislation requiring probable cause before the 
government can obtain CSLI.157 As of October 2015, a total of eight-
een states require probable cause, rather than a relevance standard, 
before obtaining CSLI.158 
Some courts consider whether the contracts between users and 
cellphone companies waive an expectation of privacy in CSLI.159 
Some opine that even if users did read the privacy policies, those 
policies may not explain the information turned over to the govern-
ment.160 Courts have also held that obtaining CSLI is unconstitu-
tional because the Fourth Amendment protects privacy in the home. 
                                                                                                             
 155 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (holding search incident 
to arrest forbade officers from searching contents of cellphone without a warrant). 
 156 See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 868 (Mass. 2014); see 
also State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013); Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504 
(Fla. 2014). 
 157 Allie Bohm, Status of Location Privacy Legislation in the States, ACLU 
(last updated Jun. 30, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-
national-security/status-location-privacy-legislation-states (Virginia, Utah, Mon-
tana, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Iowa, Indiana, Illinois, and 
Colorado). 
 158 Peter Cihon, Status of Location Privacy Legislation in the States: 2015, 
ACLU (last updated Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/status-
location-privacy-legislation-states-2015. 
 159 United States v. Graham 796 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc 
granted, 624 F. App’x 75 (“There is no evidence that Appellants here read or 
understood the Sprint/Nextel policy.”); see also Jon Leibowitz, Introductory Re-
marks at the FTC Privacy Roundtable (Dec. 7, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/-
default/files/documents/public_statements/introductory-remarks-ftc-privacy-
roundtable/091207privacyremarks.pdf; Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Rob-
erts Admits He Doesn’t Read the Computer Fine Print, A.B.A., (Oct. 20 2010, 
12:17 PM) http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_roberts_ad-
mits_he_doesnt_read_the_computer_fine_print/. 
 160 The language found in the cell-service provider’s privacy policies is gen-
eral in nature. See Verizon Full Privacy Policy, (last visited Jan. 17, 2015) (stating 
Verizon collects and uses Cell-Site Location Information), http://www.veri-
zon.com/about/privacy/policy/#infoadv; AT&T Privacy Policy, (last visited Jan. 
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Because CSLI is collected and then the location is ascertained by a 
human only after its disclosure, the argument goes that learning 
whether someone is in their home through CSLI at a particular time 
is an unreasonable search.161 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, find-
ing that no violation occurs when a person is located in his home. It 
relied on Smith to reason that Smith’s location was obtained by the 
fixing of a pen register and Smith was in his home.162 Thus, at least 
Smith does not support this proposition. But, as one scholar notes, 
the Smith decision seems at odds with cellphone technology: “[A]s 
more people do have an expectation of privacy in information 
they’ve turned over to third parties, it’s the Smith decision, and not 
the expectation of privacy, that becomes unreasonable.”163 Support-
ing this counterargument is the fact that the Smith decision did not 
focus on the location of a person in its analysis. 
Also, a landline phone number is strictly tied to a location—a 
home or business. A cellphone, on the other hand, can be anywhere 
with a viable signal. Thus, the privacy implications of CSLI should 
be analyzed in accord with the tracking device used in Knotts or 
Karo because, like that tracking device, the cellphone is not inti-
mately associated with the home directly but can find its way there. 
“Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn 
from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy 
interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amend-
ment oversight.”164 
                                                                                                             
17, 2015) (stating AT&T collects and uses Cell-Site Location Information), 
http://www.att.com/Common/about_us/privacy_policy/print_policy.html#loca-
tion. The Metro PCS privacy policy is devoid of any language explaining that 
CSLI will be turned over under the SCA. See https://www.metropcs.com/con-
tent/metro/en/mobile/metro/termsconditions/termsconditionsdetails.privacy.html 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
 161 See Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 518 (2014) (illustrating that cases al-
lowing CSLI to be freely obtained would require analysis of data and suppression 
of data where user located in home under the Supreme Court’s rationale in Karo). 
 162 See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–12 (11th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc). 
 163 Hanni Fakhoury, Smith v. Maryland Turns 35, But Its Health Is Declining, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jun. 24, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/06/smith-v-maryland-turns-35-its-healths-
declining. 
 164 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984). 
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B. The Third-Party Doctrine and CSLI 
The applicability of the third-party doctrine to CSLI signifi-
cantly affects a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Whether 
a reasonable expectations of privacy exists in CSLI involves the ap-
plicability of the third-party doctrine. At least with respect to juris-
dictions covering Florida, the courts are split as to its applicabil-
ity.165 While the Florida Supreme Court read the third-party doctrine 
narrowly in Tracey v. State,166 the Eleventh Circuit, in Davis, held 
that the third-party doctrine precludes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information conveyed to service providers.167 In cases in-
volving CSLI, there appears to be a disparity in interpretation over 
the term “voluntarily conveyed.”168 Like the Florida Supreme Court, 
other courts have read Miller and Smith narrowly, warning that a 
broad reading of “voluntary communications” fails to adequately 
consider privacy expectations in the digital age.169 These courts find 
support in dicta provided by many Supreme Court Justices, which 
repeatedly indicate displeasure with the third-party doctrine and its 
                                                                                                             
 165 Compare Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) (holding that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists in PCSLI), with In re U.S. for Historical 
Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 613 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[A]s long as the Government 
meets the statutory requirements, the SCA does not give the magistrate judge dis-
cretion to deny the Government’s application for such an order.”). See also In re 
U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S.C. Section 2703(d) 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 
80 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 2007) (“Because historical cell site information clearly 
satisfies” the requirements under section 2703(c), an order is appropriate.); In re 
Smartphone Geolocation Data App., 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in cellphone location); United 
States v. Madison, No. 11-60285, 2012 WL 3095357, at *9 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 
2012) (Rosenbaum, J.). 
 166 Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 526. 
 167 Davis, 785 F.3d at 511 (“[L]ike the bank customer in Miller and the phone 
customer in Smith, Davis has no subjective or objective reasonable expectation of 
privacy in [the service provider’s] business records . . . .”). 
 168 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). 
 169 See Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 525; see also United States v. Powell, 943 F. 
Supp. 2d 759, 770 (E.D. Mich. 2013); In re U.S. for Order Directing a Provider 
of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317–18 
(3d Cir. 2010). 
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deficiencies when applied in the modern era.170 Recently, in his con-
currence in Riley, Justice Alito called for a “new balancing of law 
enforcement and privacy interests,” stating that “we should not me-
chanically apply the rules used in the predigital era to the search of 
a cell phone.”171 
Because the third-party doctrine emphasizes the voluntary com-
munication of actions or words to third parties, the technology be-
hind CSLI is brought to the forefront of the debate. This is why it 
was crucial to painstakingly detail CSLI technology in Part I. Put 
simply, those advocating for the inapplicability of the third-party 
doctrine argue that cellphone users do not voluntarily convey 
CSLI.172 Despite the fact that companies collect and utilize CSLI to 
improve the services provided, CSLI is different than the bank rec-
ords in Miller and the phone numbers in Smith. Distinguishing Mil-
ler, Susan Freiwald argues, “Cell phone users, however, do not vol-
untarily convey location data to providers, or tell their providers to 
record it. Quite unlike bank statements, which are designed for cus-
tomer review, customers can hardly know what location data their 
providers store . . . .”173 
Consider the following: unlike the active process of entering a 
phone number, which was at issue in Smith, a user does not enter his 
                                                                                                             
 170 See U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 
U.S. 749, 763 n.14 (1989) (“Almost every such fact, however personal or sensi-
tive, is known to someone else. Meaningful discussion of privacy, therefore, re-
quires the recognition that ordinarily we deal not with an interest in total nondis-
closure but with an interest in selective disclosure.” (quoting another source)); see 
also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(stating that the third-party doctrine “approach is ill suited to the digital age, in 
which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties 
in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
2473, 2496–97 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 171 134 S. Ct. at 2496–97 (Alito J., concurring) (holding that search incident 
arrest doctrine did not allow for the search of files stored on cellphone). 
 172 Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 522 (noting that CSLI is not voluntarily conveyed to 
the company in “any meaningful way” (quoting In re U.S. for Order Directing a 
Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 
317)); see Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-
Snowden Era, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.pewinter-
net.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/ (“91% of adults in the survey 
‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that consumers have lost control over how personal 
information is collected and used by companies.”). 
 173 Freiwald, supra note 11, at 737. 
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location or the location of the target recipient’s phone when placing 
a call with a cellphone. The number itself is not tied to any location. 
Because CSLI is a by-product of the user making the call, it is a 
passive process that the phone does automatically. Without looking 
at the records, it would be impossible for a user to know what cell 
tower his phone was registering with at a particular time. Therefore, 
it is improbable that the user could communicate his precise location 
and cell site, even if the user wanted to. 
Moreover, the Smith decision involved only the numbers he di-
aled out and whether he had a privacy interest in the phone numbers 
that he chose to call from his home phone.174 If the Smith decision 
is said to control CSLI, then it should only extend to CSLI created 
by the user of the phone and not information received by the phone 
without the user’s actions. CSLI created when a call is received is 
not “voluntarily conveyed” as interpreted by Smith. The only way 
the Smith decision can apply to all CSLI is if it can be said that a 
person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his location by 
virtue of having a cellphone on his person. 
Another writer distinguishes CSLI from the voluntary convey-
ances in Miller and Smith by arguing that CSLI is an “automated 
electronic intermediary.”175 Under this theory, service providers are 
merely a conduit used to facilitate communications between parties 
who are the originator and target of the communication. Whereas 
the pen registers at issue in Smith replaced human operators, cell-
phone service is completely automated. Even if it can be said that 
cellphone transmissions were once subject to human operators, it is 
nearly impossible to imagine the number of human operators it 
would take to transmit texts, weather updates, e-mails, calls, and in-
ternet connections.176 There is no human that is involved in the pro-
cess of CSLI until that information is requested by the government. 
                                                                                                             
 174 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 738 (1979) (discussing the installa-
tion and use of a pen register, which records only the numbers dialed from a user’s 
phone). 
 175 John P. Collins, Note, Third Party Doctrine in a Digital Age, at 8, 
http://www.nyls.edu/documents/justice-action-center/student_capstone_jour-
nal/cap12collins.pdf. 
 176 International Smartphone Mobility Report – Jan. ‘15, INFORMATE MOBILE 
INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 25, 2015), http://informatemi.com/blog/?p=133 (finding that 
the average smartphone user in the United States “makes or answers 6 phone calls 
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Essentially, under this theory, the third-party doctrine should be ap-
plicable only if there is a person that the information conveyed to. 
Simply being able to ascertain the records of a completely autono-
mous process should be insufficient to satisfy the third-party doc-
trine. 
An interesting twist in the analysis of the third-party doctrine is 
that the government requires service providers to track the location 
of cellphones for emergency-response purposes. Service providers 
store CSLI not only for their own use, but also because it is man-
dated by statute.177 The rules promulgated by the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (“FCC”) mandating minimum accuracy re-
quirements of CSLI affect the debate.178 In 2011, the FCC found that 
seventy percent of 911 calls were placed from cellphones.179 In re-
sponse, the FCC promulgated rules to increase the accuracy of loca-
tion information when a cellphone user places a call to 911.180 Phase 
One of the FCC rules requires service providers to provide emer-
gency personnel with the phone number and the cell site that trans-
mitted the call.181 Phase Two requires service providers to provide 
the latitude and longitude of the phone, which must be accurate to 
within 50 to 300 meters.182 
By requiring third-party service providers to create location ser-
vices for the government, the government has essentially turned all 
participating service providers into government agents.183 It seems 
disingenuous for the government to require a third party to monitor 
the location of cellphones and then to use the third-party doctrine to 
                                                                                                             
per day, sends and receives 32 texts and spend 14 mins. On Chat/VOIP apps per 
day”). 
 177 See 47 C.F.R. § 20.18. 
 178 See id.  
 179 911 Wireless Services, F.C.C., https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/-
911-wireless-services (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) [hereinafter FCC]. 
 180 BEDELL, WIRELESS, supra note 11, at 386. 
 181 See BEDELL, CELLULAR NETWORKS, supra note 9, at 306. 
 182 Id.; see also 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h); FCC, supra note 179. 
 183 United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The govern-
ment may not do, through a private individual, that which it is otherwise forbidden 
to do. Accordingly, if in light of all the circumstances a private party conducting 
a serach must be regarded as an instrument or agent of the government, the fourth 
amendment appies to that party’s actions.”) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971)); see also United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 
461–62 (8th Cir. 1990). 
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request the records that the government compels the third party to 
create in the first place. 
IV.   SOLVING CSLI: MOSAICS, TRACKING DEVICES, AND A NEW 
INTERPRETATION OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 
The above discussion clearly raises more questions than it an-
swers, and it is understandably confusing. Some of the nation’s 
highest courts cannot pin down the arguments for and against the 
disclosure of CSLI without a warrant. Many courts and scholars ad-
vocate for clarity from the legislature,184 merely asking for clearly 
worded statutes or protection from CSLI disclosure without a war-
rant. 
Some courts find guidance in the “Mosaic Theory.”185 The “Mo-
saic Theory” encompasses the view that, by sifting through the en-
tirety of a person’s HCSLI, the government is able to create an inti-
mate depiction of the person’s life.186 It is as though the government 
can press rewind and watch a person’s movements without forming 
a suspicion of criminal activity until months or years after the data 
points were created.187 In rejecting privacy expectations in CSLI, 
                                                                                                             
 184 See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 114, at 163–70; United States v. Davis, 
785 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“Davis and amici advance thought-
ful arguments for changing the underlying and prevailing law; but these proposals 
should be directed to Congress and the state legislatures rather than to the federal 
courts.”); Freiwald, supra note 11, at 686–87 (“[P]rivacy-invading practices will 
continue until either the courts step up or Congress steps in to revise the ECPA.”). 
 185 United States v. Graham 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc 
granted, 624 F. App’x 75. For a thorough critique of the Mosaic Theory, see Orin 
S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 
(2012) (concluding that the Mosaic Theory should be rejected by the courts). 
 186 The Mosaic Theory had its beginnings in United States v. Kirschenblatt, 
where then-judge Learned Hand identified the difference between specific and 
broad information collection: it is “a totally different thing to search a man’s pock-
ets and use against him what they contain, from ransacking his house for every 
which may incriminate him . . . .” See 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926). Subse-
quently, it was defined in C.I.A. v. Sims as “‘[w]hat may seem trivial to the unin-
formed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene 
and may put the questioned item of information its the proper context.’” 471 U.S. 
159, 178 (1985) (quoting Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). 
 187 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring) (“I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will 
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Third Circuit did not reject the premise that CSLI can “be used to 
approximate the past location of a person.”188 CSLI is quite precise, 
and its precision is increasing in modern society. Even the Florida 
Supreme Court, which found a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
CSLI, rejected the Mosaic Theory as “not a workable analysis.”189 
Yet, a panel of the Fourth Circuit adopted this approach in United 
States v. Graham:190 
A person who knows all of another’s travels can de-
duce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy 
drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, 
an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associ-
ate of particular individuals or political groups—and 
not just one such fact about a person, but all such 
facts.191 
Still, others find light in the tracking-device statutes alluded to 
above.192 And some scholars find the third-party doctrine serves a 
substitutive role in modern crimes, is relatively easy to apply, and 
provides necessary clarity for law enforcement.193 
However, that the Supreme Court should interpret HCSLI and 
PCSLI collectively and alter the Katz inquiry to include the third-
party doctrine as one factor in the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
                                                                                                             
be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, 
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”). 
 188 In re U.S. for Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Dis-
close Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 312 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 189 However, in making this determination, the Florida Supreme Court relied 
on the lower court’s analysis of the Mosaic Theory in Graham v. United States, 
which was overturned and is now being reheard en banc. See Tracey v. State, 152 
So. 3d 504, 520 (Fla. 2014); United States v. Graham 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 
2015), reh’g en banc granted, 624 F. App’x 75; see also Kerr, supra note 185, at 
346 (finding the Mosaic theory to be “very difficult to administer”). 
 190 See Graham, 796 F.3d at 360. But see United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 
498, 515 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“Historical cell site location data does not 
paint the ‘intimate portrait of personal, social, religious, medical, and other activ-
ities and interactions’ that Davis claims.”). 
 191 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561–62 (D.C. Cir. 2015), quoted 
in Graham, 796 F.3d at 348. 
 192 See supra note 132 (collecting cases discussing CSLI and the tracking de-
vice theory). 
 193 See Kerr, supra note 185, at 566–71. 
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test, rather than treating it as an exception.194 Here’s how it can be 
done: First, the distinction between HCSLI and PCSLI must be 
eliminated. Drawing this distinction creates a logically untenable 
dissimilarity because cellphone technology does not distinguish be-
tween the two. The technology behind CSLI transmission does not 
support the distinction. Maintaining the distinction between HCSLI 
and PCSLI also poses analytical difficulties. Obtaining HCSLI un-
der the SCA requires that the HCSLI be a record of “other infor-
mation.” If so, at first blush it seems rather straight-forward to apply 
the SCA. What is confusing is the skepticism that courts express 
when PCSLI is requested. As mentioned above, courts appear quick 
to find that the request for PCSLI is a request for tracking device 
information. Why is it any different with HCSLI? Is a cellphone any 
less of a tracking device merely because the information has already 
been recorded? It must also be stressed that, presumably, the SCA 
operates under the auspice that the third party is voluntarily record-
ing CSLI. However, as mentioned above, the government requires 
service providers to maintain cell sites, which can accurately locate 
a cellphone. 
Further, drawing a distinction between HCSLI and PCSLI lures 
courts into the difficult task of determining where PCSLI ends and 
where HCSLI begins. United States Magistrate Judge Stephen Wil-
liam Smith articulated this conundrum: “How is ‘historical’ to be 
defined—one second after transmission? One hour? One day? One 
month?”195 Is the defining point the date of the request for infor-
mation? Is it the date that the order is issued? Also illustrative of the 
false dichotomy is that a request for PCSLI is necessarily a request 
for HCSLI from the third party. Logically, even when PCSLI is 
sought, the CSLI is transmitted to the service provider nanoseconds 
before it is conveyed to the government. Thus, at the time of con-
veyance, it is HCSLI.196 The fact that the data simply was not stored 
                                                                                                             
 194 See Freiwald, supra note 11, at 689 (“[I]f the courts take too long to address 
new technology, they create the risk not only that the technology they do address 
will be obsolete but also ‘that the Fourth Amendment will never really catch 
up.’”). 
 195 June 2010 Hearing, supra note 10, at 86. 
 196 For a more probing analysis of the “instantaneous storage theory,” see In 
re Order Authorizing Prospective and Continuous Release of Cell Site Location 
Records, 31 F. Supp. 3d 889, 892–96 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 
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at the time of the request should be irrelevant to categorization.197 
The character or nature of the data does not change; it remains CSLI. 
Regardless of whether the data is stored at the time of the request, 
the specificity of a person’s location information does not change. 
“The SCA makes no distinction between historical and prospec-
tive”198 CSLI, and there is nothing less private about CSLI that has 
already been stored by a service provider than CSLI that will be 
stored by the service provider. 
By removing the HCSLI/PCSLI distinction, courts can wrestle 
with the more pressing issue of whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists in CSLI in toto.199 The doctrines from the pre-digital 
age fail to adequately address CSLI. Technology is constantly in a 
positive feedback system: new technology is released, it becomes 
incorporated into society, then it happens again and again. “[I]f a 
new technology permits the government to access information that 
it previously could not access without a warrant, using techniques 
not regulated under preexisting rules that predate that technology, 
the effect will be that the Fourth Amendment matters less and less 
over time.”200 
                                                                                                             
 197 See Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance, supra note 80, at 831 
(“Whether police receive my location information as I ‘create’ it or a week later, 
assuming the same level of detail for both, the information—and therefore the 
benefit to law enforcement and the privacy implications—are identical.”). 
 198 United States v. Booker, No. 1:11-CR-255-1, 2013 WL 2903562, at *6 
(N.D. Ga. June 13, 2013). 
 199 Some courts currently recognize that HCSLI and PCSLI should be treated 
similarly. See United States v. White II, 62 F. Supp. 3d 614, 619 (E.D. Mich. 
2014); Booker, No. 1:11-CR-255-1, 2013 WL 2903562, at *7 (N.D. Ga. June 13, 
2013) (“While this [CSLI] is ‘prospective’ in the sense that the records had not 
yet been created at the time the Order was authorized, it is no different in sub-
stance from the historical cell site location information . . . .”); Commonwealth v. 
Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 854 n.9 (Mass. 2014) (analyzing HCSLI without distin-
guishing PCSLI); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013) (upholding reason-
able expectation in the location of a person’s cell phone on state constitutional 
grounds); In Re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register and 
Trap and Trace Devices, 632 F. Supp. 2d 202, 207 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting 
PCSLI becomes HCSLI as soon as it is recorded). 
 200 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 527 (2011). 
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As the doctrine exists now, voluntary conveyance to a third party 
makes any expectation of privacy unreasonable in the conveyed in-
formation.201 This interpretation of Supreme Court precedent forces 
courts into the minefield that has become the aforementioned juris-
prudence of CSLI. The third-party doctrine should be analyzed as 
one factor in the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy inquiry rather 
than as an exception to the inquiry’s application. The digital age has 
changed the definition of “voluntary conveyance” such that treating 
“secrecy as a perquisite for privacy” is no longer tenable.202 The Su-
preme Court cases that apply the third-party doctrine to business 
records discuss the voluntary conveyance of information to a third 
party—a person. As described above, the extension of the third-
party doctrine to business records evolved out of cases where the 
defendant made affirmative statements to another person.203 It is 
easy to conceptualize voluntary conveyance in this manner. A tells 
B incriminating statements, trusting that B will not repeat them. But, 
there is nothing preventing B from repeating A’s statement except 
B’s will. When the third-party communication involves incidental 
information, voluntary conveyance becomes more difficult to de-
fine. CSLI is the perfect example. Certainly, location information is 
conveyed to the service provider when a call is placed or received, 
but is it really a voluntary conveyance as it has been articulated in 
third-party doctrine jurisprudence? 
Perhaps it can be quite easy. CSLI can be compared to the ad-
dress and return address on envelopes sent through the mail. The 
Supreme Court held years ago that there is no privacy in that infor-
mation.204 But, again, this seems to be more of a voluntary act sim-
                                                                                                             
 201 See After United States v. Jones, supra note 80, at 434–42 (discussing the 
third-party doctrine cases and the implications of United States v. Jones). 
 202 United States v. Jones, 132 U.S. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring); see also RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A 
TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 140 (2006) (“Informational privacy does not 
mean refusing to share information with everyone.”). 
 203 See supra Part III. 
 204 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (“letters and sealed pack-
ages . . . are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their 
outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them 
in their own domiciles.”). 
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ilar to Smith than the passive communication of CSLI from a cell-
phone. It seems that the incidental communications accompanying 
technological interactions make the third-party doctrine so difficult 
to apply. 
Rather than treating the third-party doctrine as an exception to a 
user’s reasonable expectation of privacy, courts should utilize it as 
one factor in determining whether a search has occurred. The A.B.A. 
Standards for Criminal Justice: Law Enforcement Access to Third 
Party Records (“LEATPR”) is a similar proposal.205 Stephen Hen-
derson applied these standards to CSLI.206 Under the LEATPR 
standards, “law enforcement would need a warrant to access over 
twenty-four hours of location information, could access a lesser pe-
riod of location information using a lesser court order, and could 
access a record indicating location at a single point in time for any 
legitimate law enforcement purpose.”207 These standards consider 
the area of privacy expectations that the third-party doctrine cur-
rently overlooks. 
The LEATPR brings to the forefront that there exists degrees of 
privacy in information. Specifically, the LEATPR is organized 
around four factors: (1) the purpose of the initial transfer of the elec-
tronic information to a third party and the societal interest served by 
its disclosure, (2) the extent to which the information is personal and 
whether it is disclosed to third parties other than for the purpose of 
facilitating electronic transactions, (3) the accessibility of that infor-
mation by other parties, and (4) the state of the existing law.208 
Based on these factors, the amount of privacy a person expects in a 
particular document or electronic information can be determined. 
The approach taken by the LEATPR is “mildly mosaic,” as Stephen 
Henderson put it, because the LEATPR evaluates the electronic in-
                                                                                                             
 205 See A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter LEATPR]. 
 206 See also Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance, supra note 80, at 
810. For a discussion on the commentary to the LEATPR, see Susan Freiwald, 
Light in the Darkness: How the LEATPR Standards Guide Legislators in Regu-
lating Law Enforcement Access to Cell Site Location Records, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 
875 (2014) [hereinafter Freiwald, Light in the Darkness]. 
 207 See Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance, supra note 80, at 810. 
 208 See LEATPR, supra note 205, at 12. 
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formation being obtained by looking to the circumstances surround-
ing the data.209 For example, when determining the initial level of 
privacy expectations a point of electronic data should be afforded, 
the standards ask several questions like “why is this information in 
the hands of the third party?” and “is the transfer of this information 
to the third party something to be wary of chilling?”210 
To me, the LEATPR standards read as thoughtfully prepared 
guidelines, but the practical application of these standards is a con-
cern. If read as an insightful inquiry into the concerns surrounding 
the disclosure of digital communications, then these guidelines pro-
vide a fertile resource. As Susan Freiwald posits, “The LEATPR 
Standards provide a framework for members of Congress interested 
in drafting an entirely new law or amending the SCA to address law 
enforcement’s compelled disclosure of location records . . . .”211 In-
forming the legislature of concerns is a world apart from asking 
courts to implement these guidelines into workable analytical rules. 
Further, a significant problem with the guidelines is that, if imple-
mented, they would not apply to the “acquisition of information con-
temporaneous with its generation or transmission . . . .”212 In other 
words, the guidelines would maintain the distinction between 
HCSLI and PCSLI. 
Despite the LEATPR having been published in 2012, federal 
courts of appeals and state supreme courts continue to struggle to 
apply reasonable expectations of privacy and the third-party doc-
trine to technology. This suggests that these guidelines are not a 
practical implementation. Perhaps, sometimes less is more. In the 
case of voluntary communications to third parties, changing the Katz 
inquiry to add a third prong creates an applicable analytical struc-
ture. Therefore, the modified Katz inquiry would be performed as 
follows: 
                                                                                                             
 209 See Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance, supra note 80, at 823–
24. 
 210 Id. at 813. 
 211 Freiwald, Light in the Darkness, supra note 206, at 908. 
 212 LEATPR, supra note 205, at § 25-2.1(e). Stephen Henderson argues that 
the default protections of the LEATPR should apply to prospective location in-
formation because the privacy intrusion and the interests of law enforcement are 
the same as that of historic location records. See Real-Time and Historic Location 
Surveillance, supra note 80, at 831. 
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(1) Is there a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the information? 
(2) Was the information voluntarily conveyed to 
a third party, and to what degree of voluntariness if 
at all? 
(3) Notwithstanding that conveyance, is society 
prepared to accept that expectation as reasonable? 
The addition of the voluntariness prong incorporates the third-
party doctrine into the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy inquiry 
without unmooring it from prior applications. Consider Miller under 
the new inquiry. Asking the degree of voluntariness Miller had in 
communicating his account information to the bank reveals that Mil-
ler affirmatively and actively conveyed this information to use the 
services of the bank.213 There was an intention by Miller to convey 
his bank records to the bank employee. Regardless of whether he 
intended that information to be kept within the bank, his act of con-
veyance was voluntary. Likewise, in Smith, Smith’s conveyance of 
phone numbers to the telephone company was affirmative and vol-
untary.214 He intended to convey the phone numbers he dialed to the 
company so that his call could be properly directed to the intended 
recipient. The analysis of these voluntary acts informs the third 
prong of the analysis: whether society is prepared to accept that ex-
pectation as reasonable. 
Consider obtaining CSLI—either HCSLI or PCSLI—under the 
new reasonable-expectations-of-privacy analysis. Assuming a sub-
jective expectation of privacy exists, the next inquiry is to what de-
gree is CSLI voluntarily conveyed to the third party? The language 
of “to what degree” allows courts to consider the nature and means 
that the information is communicated to a third party. In this way, 
courts will be better able to adequately address the conveyance of 
incidental electronic communications. CSLI falls squarely within 
this type of electronic communication. Thus, at least for CSLI com-
municated by a cellphone to a service provider, the new inquiry 
properly addresses the technology behind its use. 
                                                                                                             
 213 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 438–39 (1976). 
 214 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 738, 745 (1979). 
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V.   SILENCE, STINGRAYS, AND CSLI 
A.   The Silent Use of Independent Cell Site Simulators 
In addition to obtaining CSLI from third-party service providers, 
the government also uses cell-site simulators. When media coverage 
of the government’s use of cell-site simulators boomed a few years 
ago, scholarship emerged discussing the secrecy surrounding cell-
site simulators.215 In fact, despite the claimed prevalent use of cell-
site simulators, there are few reported cases.216 The controversy sur-
rounding the use of cell-site simulators escalated when it became 
known that “prosecutors throw cases out rather than have the use of 
cell-site simulators revealed in court.”217 
Stingray systems function similarly to cell sites, which were dis-
cussed in Part II. In fact, Stingrays mimic cell sites. Over the past 
few years, the media have outed the government’s use of cell-site 
simulators.218 According to the Department of Justice, law enforce-
ment agencies use Stingrays either (1) “to help locate cellular de-
vices whose unique identifiers are already known to law enforce-
ment,” or (2) “to determine the unique identifiers of an unknown 
device . . . .”219 As discussed above, a cellphone communicates its 
location to a cell tower by registering with it.220 A cell-site simulator 
                                                                                                             
 215 See also Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More than a Pen 
Register, and Less than a Wiretap: What the Stingray Teaches Us About How 
Congress Should Approach the Reform of Law Enforcement Surveillance Author-
ities, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 134 (2013). 
 216 See generally United States v. Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 
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works by superseding the signal emitted from a service provider’s 
cell site within an area, causing all mobile devices to register with it 
instead of the cell site.221 Stingrays essentially trick a cellphone into 
thinking the Stingray is the closest cell site, and the cellphone then 
transmits its location information to the Stingray instead of the ser-
vice provider’s cell site. Typically, cell-site simulators canvas only 
a small area, and thus, law enforcement attach them to aircraft and 
vehicles to increase the coverage area and facilitate the location of a 
targeted device.222 
A cell-site simulator enables its operator to locate a device, in-
tercept calls and text messages, and send fake calls or texts to the 
target device to trigger the cellphone to transmit its location.223 Prac-
tically speaking, the difference between CSLI obtained through a 
cell site owned by a third party and CSLI obtained via a cell-site 
simulator used by the government is merely the presence or absence 
of the third party service provider. 
B.   Is CSLI Obtained By Stingrays A Search? 
Unlike CSLI obtained from a service provider, there is no record 
to obtain from a third party when a cell-site simulator is used. Thus, 
the statutory provisions of the SCA can be relied upon.224 However, 
there exist regulations promulgated by some of the agencies that use 
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cell-site simulators. In 1997, the Department of Justice required 
prosecutors to obtain an order under the pen-register statute before 
using cell-site simulators.225 In 2005, the Department of Justice 
stated that “a pen register/trap and trace order must be obtained by 
the government before it can use” a cell-site simulator.226 Recently, 
in September 2015, the Department of Justice changed its policy to 
require a warrant before a cell-site simulator is used.227 The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security followed suit.228 This policy change, 
however, is not without its critics.229 
At least for now, law enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators is 
self-policing. Lawmakers introduced a bill dubbed the “Cell-Site 
Simulator Privacy Act of 2015,” which would require all law en-
forcement agencies to obtain a warrant before using a cell-site sim-
ulator, regardless of the policy decisions of individual agencies.230 
Until this occurs, there may be Fourth Amendment implications re-
garding the use of CSLI obtained via a cell-site simulator. 
Comparing CSLI obtained from a third-party service provider to 
CSLI obtained from a cell-site simulator used by government re-
veals one prominent distinction. In the former, the third party is per-
forming the data collection. In the latter, the government is directly 
performing the locating. On its surface, it seems to be a more com-
pelling argument to say that the use of cell-site simulators is a 
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greater violation of the Fourth Amendment than the former. Specif-
ically, the signal from the cellphone transmitting directly to a cell-
site simulator is eerily similar to a tracking device, which many 
courts have supported in PCSLI cases.231 An argument also exists 
that the use of a cell-site simulator allows for the type of long-term, 
non-invasive tracking that the concurring justices in Jones opined 
about. Either way, there is no third-party for the government to rely 
on for the disclosure of the records. There is simply no third-party 
intermediary. Thus, the core principal of the third-party doctrine—
the presence of a third party—is absent. Accordingly, it seems that 
the unmitigated use of cell-site simulators would be an unreasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment.232 
The use of a cell-site simulator is a tracking device. The only 
difference is that there no physical installation occurring. It is true 
that the Court in Jones held that a Fourth Amendment violation oc-
curred because law enforcement agents committed trespass when 
they affixed a tracking device to a vehicle without a valid warrant.233 
However, putting aside the potential Fourth Amendment implica-
tions that accompany physical trespass of affixing a tracking device, 
not requiring a warrant to obtain CSLI makes the tracking-device 
statute virtually useless. If the government can obtain the same, if 
not more accurate, location information from a cellphone by using a 
cell-site simulator, then what is the point of the tracking-device stat-
ute and its protections? It becomes the legal equivalent of a vestigial 
organ. 
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If CSLI can be obtained via a cell-site simulator without a war-
rant, then the circumstances in which the government would actually 
install a tracking device is limited to situations where the govern-
ment is concerned with tracking the location of a particular item—a 
car or contraband—rather than the location of a person. Tracking a 
particular item is significantly less invasive than tracking a person 
surreptitiously through his passively created CSLI. Yet, a warrant 
would still be required to affix a tracking device to an object.234 On 
the other hand, CSLI would be obtainable without one simply be-
cause no physical installation occurs. It is for that reason, that the 
concurring justices in Jones and the courts in CSLI cases are right-
fully concerned, and some have relied upon the Mosaic Theory in 
finding a Fourth Amendment violation.235 
Like CSLI obtained from third-party service providers, cell-site 
simulators should be analyzed under the modified Katz test. Despite 
the fact that there is no service provider to act as an intermediary, 
the privacy expectations still depend on CSLI, not on who is receiv-
ing the data. Although no third party is used when the government 
uses a cell-site simulator, a person’s reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy is affected in the same manner. This is a function of CSLI. The 
cellphone emits CSLI, and it does so indiscriminately. It can be ar-
gued that if a person knows his cellphone uses CSLI to function, 
then he can be said to be voluntarily communicating it to anyone 
who may “want[] to look . . . .”236 It wouldn’t matter if the govern-
ment or a service provider is collecting that information.237 
The reverse can also be argued. CSLI can be considered an en-
tirely passive process insofar as the user does not voluntarily convey 
his location in any meaningful way simply by having a cellphone on 
his person. In either case, it becomes apparent that the central focus 
is the CSLI and its communicative process—not the recipient. Thus, 
it is the incidental communication of CSLI that should control this 
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1300 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
 
debate. The modified Katz test introduced above applies to cell-site 
simulators because the reasonable expectation of privacy depends 
on the privacy a person has in CSLI. This, in turn, stems from an 
analysis of whether CSLI is voluntarily communicated to third-party 
service providers. If courts address these issues with an understand-
ing of the technology, then the result should be the same under either 
technology. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts must stop waiting for the technological dust to settle, so 
to speak, before addressing the issues that accompany it; technology 
will never stop changing. Many courts have attempted to apply ex-
isting precedent to new technology. As this discussion of CSLI il-
lustrates, the doctrines used are ill-applied. The third-party doctrine 
addresses scenarios where information is affirmatively communi-
cated from one person to another, and whether there is any reasona-
ble expectation that the person told will not communicate that infor-
mation to law enforcement. Quite simply, the CSLI debate illus-
trates that it does not adequately address passive electronic commu-
nications. 
As a review of the technology illustrates, whether the govern-
ment obtains information from a third-party service provider or from 
using a cell-site simulator, courts need to eliminate the fictional 
HCSLI–PCSLI dichotomy. The technology behind cellphone com-
munications makes clear that there is no technological difference 
between HCSLI and PCSLI. Further, modifying the Katz test to in-
corporate the third-party doctrine would lead to uniformity among 
the courts—at least in the analytical framework applied to CSLI 
cases. Doing so integrates an inquiry similar to that of the LEATPR 
guidelines without the impracticality of a verbose, multi-factor test. 
Finally, there should be no difference in expectations of privacy be-
tween the use of a third-party service provider and cell-site simula-
tor. Courts need to focus the inquiry on CSLI and not the technology 
using the CSLI. Society and its expectations of privacy are ever-
changing. Whether privacy is reasonably expected in CSLI or not,238 
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there must be some uniformity among the courts so that society has 
guidance. The modified Katz inquiry proposed here within provides 
such analytical uniformity. 
 
